Markets and operations: 2011 Q2 by Windram, Richard & Weeken, Olaf
86 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
Sterling financial markets
Overview 
Financial markets have remained resilient in the face of a
number of significant events over the review period.  These
included continued political tensions in the Middle East and
North Africa, ongoing concerns about the sustainability of
fiscal positions in some euro-area periphery countries and the
Japanese earthquake and tsunami.
In the United Kingdom, weaker-than-expected activity data
contributed to expectations for the timing of an increase in
Bank Rate being pushed back.  
Fiscal developments continued to be a key influence on
international sovereign bond markets.  In the US Treasury
market there was little lasting market reaction to 
Standard & Poor’s announcement of a revision to its outlook
for the US sovereign credit rating from stable to negative.  
But uncertainty persisted about how some euro-area 
member countries will resolve the fiscal challenges that they
face.  Government bond yields in Greece, Portugal and Ireland
rose sharply relative to those in Germany;  movements for
other member countries were more muted over the review
period.
Commodity prices fell sharply in early May, broadly reversing
the increases earlier in the review period, and, in some cases,
ending the period lower.
Recent developments in sterling capital markets
Monetary policy and short-term interest rates
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
maintained Bank Rate at 0.5% and the stock of purchased
assets at £200 billion.
UK CPI inflation remained above target with significant
month-to-month variation during the review period.  But
weaker-than-expected activity data contributed to market
participants pushing back their expectations for the timing of
an increase in Bank Rate.  Consistent with this, forward sterling
overnight index swap (OIS) rates fell across the curve 
(Chart 1).  According to this measure, market participants
expect the MPC to have raised Bank Rate by 25 basis points by
February 2012, about seven months later than at the time of
the previous Bulletin.
A Reuters poll released after the review period showed that a
majority of the economists surveyed believed that the MPC
was most likely to raise Bank Rate in 2011 Q4.  That was a
quarter later than at the time of the 2011 Q1 Bulletin.
Option-implied volatility of three-month Libor — a measure 
of near-term interest rate uncertainty — fell over the review
period, reversing the increase in late 2010 (Chart 2). 
Elsewhere, in the United States, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) confirmed that it would complete its
planned $600 billion asset purchase programme by the end of
2011 Q2.  US forward OIS rates fell over the review period,
which contacts attributed to both weaker-than-expected data
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(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s overnight index swap (OIS) curves.
Chart 1 Instantaneous forward interest rates derived
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and statements by policymakers (Chart 1).  In line with market
expectations, the European Central Bank (ECB) raised its 
main refinancing rate by 25 basis points in April, to 1.25%.
Euro-area OIS rates were little changed over the review period.
At the short end of the money market curve, UK overnight
interest rates traded at or around Bank Rate throughout the
review period (a new sterling secured overnight interest rate —
the repurchase overnight index average (RONIA) — is
described on pages 97–98).  In the United States, overnight
interest rates fell relative to the interest rate paid on reserves
held at the Federal Reserve.  Contacts attributed this to a
change in policy by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
which included a change in the base on which bank deposit
insurance fees are charged from domestic deposits to a
measure that includes banks’ reserves balances.  In the 
euro area, the euro overnight index average (EONIA) traded
closer to the ECB’s main refinancing rate than during the
previous review period.  Contacts attributed this to lower
aggregate liquidity held by euro-area banks over and above
that necessary to meet reserve requirements.
Long-term interest rates
Nominal forward interest rates derived from government 
bond yields fell across the yield curve in the United Kingdom
and the United States (Chart 3).  In the euro area, 
longer-dated forward interest rates also fell, but there was
little change at shorter horizons.  In the United Kingdom and
the United States, contacts attributed the changes at shorter
horizons to the revised path for policy expectations.
Five-year interest rates, five years forward, which should be
less affected by cyclical developments, fell (Chart 4).  In the
United Kingdom, this largely reflected a decline in implied
inflation towards the end of the period, whereas in the 
United States and the euro area it was attributable mainly to 
a decline in real interest rates.
In the US Treasury market there was little lasting reaction to
Standard & Poor’s announcement of a revision to its outlook
for the US sovereign credit rating from stable to negative.
Concerns about fiscal developments continued, however, to be
a key influence on bond yields of some euro-area periphery
economies. 
Over the review period, the yield spreads of Greek, Irish 
and Portuguese bonds over German bonds (bunds) rose
sharply (Chart 5).  On 6 April, the Portuguese Government
informed the European Commission of its intention to ask for
the activation of financial support mechanisms.  This was
largely expected by market participants, but there was
uncertainty around the extent and form of the support
mechanism.  And market participants have increasingly
focused on whether the existing support package for Greece
will prove to be sufficient given the economic backdrop.
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Chart 2 Volatility of three-month Libor implied by
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(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by France and Germany.


















Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by France and Germany.
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Operations within the sterling monetary
framework and other market operations
Over the review period, the level of reserves continued to be
determined by (i) the stock of reserves injected via the Asset
Purchase Facility (APF), (ii) the level of reserves supplied by 
long-term repo open market operations (OMOs), and (iii) the
net impact of other sterling (‘autonomous factor’) flows across
the Bank’s balance sheet.  The box on pages 90–91 provides
more detail on the APF.  This box describes the Bank’s
operations within the sterling monetary framework over the
review period, and other market operations.
Operational Standing Facilities
Since 5 March 2009, the rate paid on the Operational Standing
Deposit Facility has been zero, while all reserves account
balances have been remunerated at Bank Rate.  Reflecting this,
average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each of the
maintenance periods under review.  Average use of the lending
facility was also £0 million throughout the period.
Indexed long-term repo OMOs
As part of its provision of liquidity insurance to the banking
system, the Bank conducts indexed long-term repo (ILTR)
operations.  The Bank offers reserves via ILTRs once each
calendar month;  typically, the Bank will conduct two
operations with a three-month maturity and one operation
with a six-month maturity in each calendar quarter.
Participants are able to borrow against two different sets of
collateral.  One set corresponds with securities eligible in the
Bank’s short-term repo operations (‘narrow collateral’), and
the other set contains a broader class of high-quality debt
securities that, in the Bank’s judgement, trade in liquid markets
(‘wider collateral’).
The Bank offered £5 billion via three-month ILTR operations on
both 15 March 2011 and 12 April 2011, and £2.5 billion via a
six-month operation on 17 May 2011 (Table 1).  Two out of the
three operations were uncovered, with the three-month April
operation recording the lowest cover since the launch of ILTRs
in June 2010.  
The stop-out spread — the difference between clearing
spreads for wider and narrow collateral — is an indicator of
potential stresses in the market.  In the March operation, this
spread was similar to the previous three-month operations.
But the stop-out spread in the April operation was the lowest
in a three-month operation to date, at 18 basis points.
The proportion of the three-month funds allocated to wider
collateral in the March and April operations fell compared with
those held in December and January, from an average of 19%
to 7%. 
The six-month operation on 17 May had a higher cover ratio
than the February ILTR, but remained uncovered, with a cover
ratio of 0.97.  The May ILTR produced the lowest stop-out
spread to date, at 16 basis points.  This compares with an
average of 50 basis points across previous six-month ILTRs.
The proportion of reserves allocated against wider collateral in
May was the lowest to date at 1%, down from 51% in
February.  This in part reflected the significantly smaller
number of bids received against wider collateral.
Reserves provided via ILTRs during the review period were
more than offset by the maturity of the previous long-term
repo and ILTR operations.  Consequently, the stock of liquidity
provided through longer-term operations declined.
The box on page 93 summarises some of the results from the
first twelve months of ILTR operations.
Discount Window Facility
The Discount Window Facility (DWF) is a permanent facility to
provide liquidity insurance to the banking system.  It allows
eligible banks to borrow gilts against a wide range of collateral.
On 5 April 2011, the Bank announced that the average daily
amount outstanding in the 30-day DWF between 1 October
and 31 December 2010 was £0 million.  The Bank also
announced that the average daily amount outstanding in the
Table 1 Indexed long-term repo operations
Total Collateral set summary
Narrow Wider
15 March 2011 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000 
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 5,525 5,255  270 
Amount allocated (£ millions) 5,000  4,730  270 
Cover 1.11 1.05 0.05
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 22 
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 22
12 April 2011 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 3,535 3,250 285 
Amount allocated (£ millions) 3,535 3,250  285 
Cover 0.71 0.65 0.06 
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 1 19 
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 18
17 May 2011 (six-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 2,500
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 2,435 2,335 100 
Amount allocated (£ millions) 2,360 2,335 25
Cover 0.97 0.93 0.04
Clearing spread above Bank Rate (basis points) 0 16 
Stop-out spread (basis points)(b) 16
(a) Due to the treatment of paired bids, the sum of bids received by collateral set may not equal total bids
received.
(b) Difference between clearing spreads for wider and narrow collateral.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 89
364-day DWF between 1 October and 31 December 2009 was
£0 million.
In accordance with the announcement on 30 November 2010,
the Bank started accepting loan portfolios as eligible collateral
in the DWF from April 2011.(1)
Other operations
Special Liquidity Scheme
The Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) was introduced in 
April 2008 to improve the liquidity position of the banking
system by allowing banks and building societies to swap their
high-quality mortgage-backed and other securities for 
UK Treasury bills for up to three years.  The Scheme was
designed to finance part of the overhang of illiquid assets on
banks’ balance sheets by exchanging them temporarily for
more easily tradable assets. 
When the drawdown period for the SLS closed at the end of
January 2009, £185 billion of UK Treasury bills had been lent
under the SLS.  In order to prevent a refinancing ‘cliff’, the Bank
has held bilateral discussions with all users of the Scheme to
ensure that there are plans in place to reduce their use of the
Scheme in a smooth fashion.  The impact of these repayment
plans are shown in aggregate in Chart A, along with the
repayment profile based on counterparties’ contractual
repayment obligations at end-2009 Q4, and the profile of
actual repayments to date.  By end-May 2011, £148 billion had
been repaid, compared with £94 billion at end-February 2011.
US dollar repo operations
In response to renewed strains in the short-term funding
market for US dollars, from 11 May 2010 the Bank, in concert
with other central banks, reintroduced weekly fixed-rate
tenders with a seven-day maturity to offer US dollar 
liquidity.  As of 20 May 2011, there had been no use of the
Bank’s facility.
Foreign exchange intervention
On 18 March 2011, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors announced that, in response to the appreciation 
of the yen following the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, 
and at the request of the Japanese authorities, the authorities
of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
the European Central Bank would join with Japan in 
concerted intervention in foreign exchange markets.(2) On 
18 March 2011, the Bank, under instruction from HM Treasury,
and using the United Kingdom’s official foreign exchange
reserves, sold yen and purchased sterling in the foreign
exchange market to give effect to the G7 Finance Ministers’
communiqué.
Bank of England balance sheet:  capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, for example in the Bank for International
Settlements, and the Bank’s physical assets), together with
aggregate cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of 
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
changes in investment policy.
As of 20 May 2011 the portfolio included around £3.4 billion of
gilts and £0.5 billion of other debt securities.  Over the period
from 26 February 2011 to 20 May 2011, gilt purchases were
conducted in accordance with the quarterly announcements
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(1) Further details are in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice101130dwf.pdf.
(2) Further details are in the HM Treasury press release available at 
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Asset purchases
(1)
The Bank did not undertake any Asset Purchase Facility (APF)
gilt purchases over the review period.  As a result, the stock of
gilts held by the APF in terms of the amount paid to sellers
remained at £198.3 billion.(2)
Purchases of high-quality private sector assets financed by the
issuance of Treasury bills and the Debt Management Office’s
(DMO’s) cash management operations continued, in line with
the arrangements announced on 29 January 2009.(3)
Table 1 summarises operations under the APF over the review
period by type of asset. 
Corporate bonds
The Bank continued to offer to purchase and sell corporate
bonds via the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme.
Reflecting the improvement in the corporate bond market
since the Scheme was introduced, the Bank announced in late
2010 that it would adapt its reserve pricing to permit relatively
more sales of bonds in the future.  The Scheme continues to
serve a useful role as a backstop, particularly during periods of
market uncertainty.
Over the review period, activity in the Bank’s auctions
continued to be driven by broader market conditions.  Sales of
corporate bonds rose, while purchases fell, and so as of 
19 May 2011 the Bank’s portfolio totalled £1,153 million,
compared to £1,304 million at the end of the previous review
period.  Market contacts suggested that this pattern of usage
of the Scheme predominantly reflected more positive market
sentiment and continued limited new issuance.
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
On 15 November 2010, the Bank provided twelve months’
notice of its intention to withdraw this scheme, reflecting a
sustained improvement in the sterling commercial paper
market.
Average spreads on sterling-denominated CP over the review
period were broadly stable and remain well below the levels
seen in early 2009.  Usage of the APF Commercial Paper
Facility remained at £0 million over the period.
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short 
term and provide credit to companies that support economic
activity in the United Kingdom.(4) The Bank announced on 
15 November 2010 that it had made a programme eligible 
for this facility.  This programme has since issued SCP to 
the APF.
Table 1 APF transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial paper Secured commercial  Gilts Corporate bond Total(b)
paper Purchases Sales
24 February 2011(c)(d) 0 25 198,275 1,304 199,605
3 March 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 March 2011 0 0 0 0 5 -5
17 March 2011 0 30 0 17 0 47
24 March 2011 0 0 0 5 2 3
31 March 2011 0 0 0 0 3 -3
7 April 2011 0 0 0 0 29 -29
14 April 2011 0 0 0 2 20 -18
21 April 2011 0 30 0 0 19 11
28 April 2011 0 0 0 0 15 -15
5 May 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 May 2011 0 30 0 0 51 -21
19 May 2011 0 30 0 0 29 1
Total financed by a deposit from the DMO(d)(e) – 30 – 261  291
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) – – 198,275 892  199,167
Total asset purchases(d)(e) – 30 198,275  1,153  199,458
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to the
nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Measured as amount outstanding as at 24 February 2011.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis. 
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 91
Gilt lending facility(5)
The Bank continued to offer to lend some of its gilt holdings
via the DMO in return for other UK government collateral.  In
the three months to 31 March 2011, a daily average of 
£1,476 million of gilts were lent as part of the gilt lending
facility.  This was an increase from an average of £1,241 million
in the previous quarter.  The increase in the amount of gilts
lent to the DMO resulted from an apparent shortage of
particular gilts, which meant that market participants chose to
borrow from the DMO rather than obtain the gilts in the
market.
(1) The data cut-off for this box is 19 May 2011, unless otherwise stated.  For further
discussion on asset purchases see the Asset Purchase Facility Quarterly Report available
at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/markets/apf/quarterlyreport.htm.
(2) Further details of individual operations are available at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
(3) The APF was initially authorised to purchase private sector assets financed by Treasury
bills and the DMO’s cash management operations.  Its remit was extended to enable
the Facility to be used as a monetary policy tool on 3 March 2009.  All purchases of
assets between 6 March 2009 and 4 February 2010 were financed by central bank
reserves.  Since 4 February 2010 all purchases have been financed by the issuance of
Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management operations. 
(4) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.
(5) For more details on the gilt lending facility, see the box ‘Gilt lending facility’ in the
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 4, page 253.
between bonds issued by those countries perceived to be most
vulnerable and those issued by Spain and Italy, where
movements in government bond spreads have been more
muted.
In the United Kingdom, gilt yields fell relative to bunds.
Market contacts attributed this to changes in near-term
interest rate expectations.
Bank funding markets 
Bank funding markets remained resilient.  From the start of
March to the end of the review period, UK banks issued 
£45 billion of debt in public markets (Chart 6).  This compares
to a combined issuance of £29 billion over those three months
in 2010.  Contacts reported, however, that issuance had been
tempered somewhat, in part reflecting banks being less willing
to issue during the periods of heightened uncertainty
associated with both the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, 
and the ongoing political turmoil in the Middle East and 
North Africa.
Banks continued to use part of the funding raised to reduce
their use of the Bank’s Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) (see the
box on pages 88–89).
The unsecured market remains a major source of funding for
the UK banking sector.  The majority of this funding continues
to be in the form of short-dated floating-rate instruments,
although there were some signs of a lengthening in maturities
over the review period.  There was also a pickup in 
euro-denominated issuance since the previous Bulletin.
Contacts attributed this in part to a desire by banks to diversify
issuance away from the US dollar markets on which they had
relied earlier in the year.  But contacts also noted an increased
appetite for euro-denominated debt among investors



















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Spreads over ten-year German government bond yields.























Sources:  Bank of England, Dealogic and Bank calculations. 
(a) Includes debt issued by Banco Santander, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Co-operative Financial
Services, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, National Australia Bank, Nationwide, Northern Rock
and RBS.  Term issuance refers here to securities with an original contractual maturity or
earliest call date of at least 18 months.  It includes subordinated lower Tier 2 and Tier 3
capital instruments with debt features.
(b) Medium-term notes.
(c) Residential mortgage-backed securities. 
(d) Senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
(e) Commercial mortgage-backed securities.
(f) Asset-backed securities.
(g) Data are up to 20 May 2011.
Chart 6 Term issuance by the major UK lenders in public
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write-downs onto senior debt holders.  In the secondary
market there appeared to be little immediate reaction
following Moody’s announcement that it would review its
assumptions for the level of government and central bank
support it assumes when rating senior debt of UK banks.
Subsequent to the review period, Moody’s announced rating
reviews, outlook changes and rating affirmations for a number
of UK financial institutions.
Covered bond issuance continued to be an important source of
funding for banks, particularly for those with limited access to
unsecured funding.  According to contacts, investors were
attracted by the spreads on covered bonds, which were, on
average, similar to those on unsecured issuance, but offered
recourse to the underlying pool of assets in addition to
recourse to the issuer.  Furthermore, regulatory developments
had made covered bonds a more attractive investment for
insurance companies.  Contacts continued to note, however,
that increased covered bond issuance meant that unsecured
creditors had recourse to a progressively smaller proportion of
a bank’s balance sheet in the event of a bank resolution, which
may affect the ability of banks to access unsecured funding
during times of stress. 
Primary market activity in asset-backed securities remained
low.  Contacts noted, however, that the first UK commercial
mortgage-backed security (CMBS) since the financial crisis is
being marketed to investors.  Developments in the primary
market for UK CMBS are reviewed on pages 96–97.
Five-year UK bank credit default swap (CDS) premia, one
indicator of long-term funding costs, ended the review period
little changed (Chart 7).  The spread of short-term interbank
borrowing rates relative to OIS rates, an indicator of 
short-term bank funding conditions, rose slightly for sterling 
but remained close to the levels that have prevailed since late
2009 (Chart 8). 
Corporate capital markets 
Equity prices in the United Kingdom and in the United States
ended the review period little changed, but fell by 2.6% in the
euro area (Chart 9).  These changes, however, mask a sharp fall
in equity prices in mid-March, following the Japanese
earthquake and tsunami and amid heightened political
tensions in the Middle East and North Africa.  The Japanese
equity market fell by almost 18% in the immediate aftermath
of the disaster and ended the review period around 12% lower.
The falls in equity prices were accompanied by a rise in 
option-implied equity volatility, a forward-looking measure of
uncertainty, although this fell back subsequently (Chart 10).
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Three-month Libor-OIS spreads derived from Libor fixings.



















Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior CDS prices.
(b) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Morgan Stanley.
(c) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered.
(d) Average of BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Santander,
Société Générale, UBS and UniCredit.
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(a) Indices are quoted in domestic currency terms, except for the MSCI Emerging Markets index,
which is quoted in US dollar terms. 
(b) The MSCI Emerging Markets index is a capitalisation-weighted index that monitors the
performance of stocks in emerging markets.
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The Bank’s indexed long-term repo operations
Background
The Bank revised the design of its long-term repo operations in
June 2010.(1) At the time the new auction design was
introduced, the Bank announced that it would confirm the
operational framework after a period of observing the
functioning of the new operations.  
The primary objective of the indexed long-term repo (ILTR)
operations is to provide liquidity insurance without distorting
commercial banks’ incentives for prudent liquidity
management, and while minimising the risks being taken by
the Bank.  To date, the Bank has offered ILTRs on a monthly
basis with two £5 billion auctions with a three-month maturity
and one £2.5 billion auction with a six-month maturity offered
in each calendar quarter. 
The new operations allow participants to bid against two
distinct sets of collateral known as ‘narrow collateral’ and
‘wider collateral’ with the split of lending between the two sets
determined as part of the auction.  
This box reviews some of the results from the first twelve
operations held between June 2010 and May 2011.
Operational features
The ILTRs operate a uniform price allocation method.  This
means that every successful bidder on a given collateral set
pays the same price (the clearing rate).  This should mean that
participants face little incentive to alter their bids based on
assumptions about other participants’ likely behaviour.  It is
difficult to establish the extent to which the change to a
uniform price allocation mechanism has affected participants’
bidding strategies.  Moreover, this may be more easily
observable in stressed circumstances when the value placed on
longer-term liquidity is likely to be more variable across
participants.
In addition to submitting individual bids against each collateral
set, participants may choose to submit ‘paired bids’, consisting
of a single nominal amount and two spreads at which the
participant is willing to borrow against the delivery of narrow
and wider collateral respectively.  This increases the likelihood
that participants will succeed in raising a specific quantity of
liquidity while avoiding any risk of overallotment.  There has
been limited use of this new feature to date. 
Auction results
On average, there has been greater demand relative to the
amount on offer in the auctions with a six-month maturity.
Counterparties suggest that this in part reflected the
attractiveness of securing longer-term liquidity resulting from
the need to comply with new regulatory liquidity requirements
and, particularly in the initial operations, the relative scarcity
of longer-maturity market funding. 
Cover (the ratio of total bids to the amount on offer) has
averaged 1.21 and 1.50 across three-month and six-month
operations respectively.  The average level of cover across
operations of the same maturity was higher during the first six
months of operations.  Contacts suggested that the reduced
level of participation in the second six months reflected the
increased availability of longer-term liquidity in the market.
With the exception of the May six-month ILTR auction, which
produced the lowest clearing spread on wider collateral across
auctions to date (Chart A) — clearing spreads for wider
collateral in six-month auctions have been well above clearing
spreads in the three-month auctions.  In general, clearing
spreads across auctions were close to market price indicators
for the same maturity. 
Operational framework 
The Bank has previously stated that it could adjust the
frequency, size or maturity of ILTRs in light of evidence of
system-wide stress, including as revealed by demand in
previous auctions.  The majority of bids in ILTRs to date have
been against narrow collateral, while the pattern of bids
received and broader indicators of market conditions have not
been indicative of market-wide stress.  Reflecting this, the
Bank made no changes to these parameters over the period.
But the Bank will keep these parameters under review in light
of market conditions and revealed demand in future
operations.
Based on the operations to date, the Bank is satisfied that the
operational framework outlined in the Market Notice of 
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Chart A ILTR allocation and clearing spreads
(1) For further details see ‘The Bank’s new indexed long-term repo operations’, in the
2010 Q2 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, pages 90–91.
(2) Available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice100615.pdf.94 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
corporate earnings supported a recovery in UK, US and 
euro-area equity prices. 
The changes in equity prices over the review period also
masked divergences between different sectors, with the oil and
gas sector among the worst performing.  The falls in the oil and
gas sector coincided with sharp falls in commodity prices in
early May (Chart 11).  For example, the S&P GSCI index for
energy commodities fell by more than 10%, reversing earlier
gains to end the review period little changed.  Industrial metals
ended the review period 7% lower and the price of silver fell by
almost 30% in the three weeks from its peak at the end of
April.  Contacts attributed the falls to a number of factors,
including weaker-than-expected activity data and associated
concerns about the strength of the global recovery.
Spreads on investment-grade corporate bonds denominated in
sterling and US dollar were broadly stable during the review
period, while euro-denominated bond spreads continued to
narrow (Chart 12).  Contacts largely attributed such resilience
in the face of the aforementioned events to the abundance of
liquidity, but noted that the strength of corporate balance
sheets also played a role.  Spreads on sterling and 
euro-denominated investment-grade bonds remained,
however, above their pre-crisis long-term averages.
International high-yield bond spreads were also little changed
since the previous Bulletin.  As global issuance of high-yield
bonds reached record levels in the year to date, some contacts
thought that high-yield bond prices were supported by
investors seeking to maintain returns in a low-yield
environment, particularly in the United States.  This was
consistent with continued strong inflows into high-yield bond
mutual funds over the review period, although the pace had
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Source:  Standard & Poor’s.
(a) Series refer to S&P GSCI total return indices.
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(a) Option-adjusted spreads over government bond yields.
(b) Dashed lines:  1997–2007 averages.
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Source:  Emerging Portfolio Fund Research.
Chart 13 Net inflows into global high-yield bond mutual
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UK private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) continued to
rely on the corporate bond market as an important source of
funding, with cumulative gross issuance in the year to date
above its average between 2003 and 2008 (Chart 14).  
In the United States, increasing mergers and acquisitions
activity has been reported as supporting bond issuance.  There
have also been signs of a relaxation in credit standards,
especially in the leveraged loan market.  These include an
increase in the proportion of so-called ‘covenant-lite’ loans,
which provide less protection to lenders, and the issuance of
debt to pay special dividends, so-called ‘dividend
recapitalisations’.
In contrast, contacts reported that the proceeds of bond
issuance in Europe continued to be used mostly to refinance
maturing debt.  Consistent with this, aggregate net bond
issuance by UK PNFCs over the past 18 months has been
below its monthly average between 2003 and 2008, although
it has increased somewhat in recent months (Chart 15).  Net
equity issuance turned negative as gross issuance remained
subdued and share buyback activity picked up.  Contacts
attributed the recent increase in share buybacks to a reduction
in uncertainty about future cash requirements, although
buyback activity remains well below pre-crisis levels.
Foreign exchange
The sterling exchange rate index (ERI) remained within the
relatively narrow band in which it has traded since the start of
2010 (Chart 16).  Over the review period, sterling depreciated
by 2% against the euro.  This was partly offset by a 1%
appreciation against the US dollar, leaving the sterling ERI 1%
below its level at the start of the period. 
At the end of the review period, the changes in sterling
bilateral exchange rates since the previous Bulletin were
broadly consistent with changes in relative interest rates
(Chart 17).  Moreover, the euro-sterling exchange rate closely
tracked movements in relative interest rates throughout the
review period.
Market-based measures of forward-looking uncertainty about
the sterling-euro and sterling-US dollar bilateral exchange
rates were little changed over the review period (Chart 18).
But they did rise for the sterling-yen exchange rate, triggered
by uncertainty about the economic impacts of the earthquake
and tsunami in Japan.  The yen appreciated sharply
immediately following these events, which contacts attributed
to expectations that Japanese insurance companies would
repatriate assets to meet claims.  But the yen subsequently
depreciated following an announcement by G7 Finance
Ministers of a co-ordinated intervention in foreign exchange
markets (this is described in the box on pages 88–89).  Over
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Chart 16 Cumulative changes in sterling ERI and
bilateral exchange rates since 4 January 201096 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
Market intelligence on developments in
market structure
In discharging its responsibilities to maintain monetary
stability and contribute to financial stability, the Bank gathers
information from contacts across a wide spectrum of financial
markets.  This intelligence helps inform the Bank’s assessment
of monetary conditions and possible sources of financial
instability and is routinely synthesised with research and
analysis in the Inflation Report and the Financial Stability
Report.  More generally, regular dialogue with market contacts
provides valuable insights about how markets function, which
provides a context for policy formulation, including the design
and evaluation of the Bank’s own market operations.  The Bank
also conducts occasional market surveys to gather additional
quantitative information on certain markets.
Based on intelligence of this kind, this section first reviews
developments in the primary market for UK commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).  It then describes a new
sterling secured overnight interest rate — the repurchase
overnight index average (RONIA). 
The UK commercial mortgage-backed securities
market
A commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) is a debt
instrument where the payment of interest depends on the cash
flow generated by a single or a pool of commercial mortgage
loans.  CMBS are typically issued in tranches, with each
tranche providing a different level of credit protection.
In common with other securitisation markets, the CMBS
market has been severely impacted by the financial crisis:
there has been no issuance of a CMBS secured on UK
commercial property since August 2007, although contacts
reported that one new transaction is being marketed to
investors.(1) By contrast, in the United States, contacts
reported that there was CMBS issuance of around $12 billion in
2010, and they expect $35 billion–$45 billion of issuance in
2011, albeit these amounts are well below the issuance levels
of 2006 and 2007. 
Contacts partly attributed the lack of UK CMBS issuance to the
high level of yields required by investors, which in recent years
has often made new issuance uneconomic.  Contacts have also
noted some features of the UK CMBS market that have made
new issuance more difficult than in the United States.  These
features are described below. 
UK and US CMBS
The US CMBS market originated in the 1990s and is said to be
around $600 billion in size.  The market grew rapidly in the
years before the financial crisis;  contacts reported issuance of
more than $200 billion in 2007.  The financial crisis then led 
to the effective closure of the market before it reopened last
year.
According to contacts, a typical US CMBS contains rarely 
less than 30 loans and often more than 100 loans.  The
diversification provided by a large number of loans means that
investors are less exposed to the performance of each
individual loan, thereby increasing the homogeneity of 
US CMBS.  Furthermore, in the United States, borrowers are
often willing to accept long-term loans that are difficult or
expensive to repay early.  This helps US CMBS to be structured
as a long-dated fixed-coupon instrument that is attractive to

















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
Chart 18 Three-month option-implied volatility of
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(a) For more information on the analytics required to isolate the impact of interest rate ‘news’
on exchange rates, see Brigden, A, Martin, B and Salmon, C (1997), ‘Decomposing exchange
rate movements according to the uncovered interest rate parity condition’, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, November, pages 377–89. 
Chart 17 Implied contribution of interest rate ‘news’ to
cumulative changes in sterling bilateral exchange rates
since the previous Bulletin(a)
(1) In the United Kingdom, some corporates have issued long-dated fixed-rate bonds
secured on real estate as part of sale and leaseback transactions.  However, market
participants tend to regard these transactions as a form of corporate debt, rather than
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The amount of outstanding CMBS secured on UK commercial
property is said to be around £35 billion.  Most of this was
issued in 2005, 2006 and the early part of 2007.  According to
contacts, there are a number of key features that distinguish
UK CMBS from US CMBS.  For example, the smaller size of 
the UK commercial property market means that a UK CMBS
will typically only contain a few loans, resulting in little
diversification for investors.  Another difference is that 
UK CMBS are normally shorter-dated floating-rate
instruments, as this structure has previously been attractive 
to both borrowers and investors.
Challenges facing the UK CMBS market
The structure of UK CMBS means that in the past the market
has had a different kind of investor base to US CMBS.  In fact,
before the financial crisis, the largest buyers of UK CMBS were
banks and off balance sheet investment vehicles.  Since the
financial crisis, this investor base has largely disappeared.
Contacts cited this as one of the reasons why the UK market
has been slow to reopen. 
Contacts also highlighted a range of features that have caused
problems with pre-crisis UK CMBS issuance.  One example
cited is the absence of a common legal structure and the
associated lack of certainty over how problems — such as
situations where the underlying loans have missed interest
payments or cannot be refinanced — will be resolved.  In
addition, in some cases, transaction documentation has been
found to contain mistakes.  Contacts also noted that the lack
of diversification in a typical UK CMBS means that it is
especially important for investors to conduct a detailed
analysis of the underlying loans.  Information on this is,
however, often said to be difficult to obtain.
The faster recovery of the US market is reported in part to
reflect its more established nature.  Contacts also noted that,
in the United States, non-bank financial institutions such as
insurance companies have been direct lenders in commercial
real estate for some time.  This is said to open up an investor
base that is already familiar with the risks inherent in
commercial property debt.  Many investors are also attracted
by the long-dated fixed-rate format of US CMBS.
The outlook for the UK CMBS market
Contacts reported that for the UK CMBS market to
successfully reopen, issuers will need to address the concerns
raised by investors and expect new CMBS to be simpler, more
transparent and display higher underwriting standards than
some pre-crisis transactions.  In this vein, the Commercial Real
Estate Finance Council (CREFC) — an industry trade
association — has set up a committee to consider common
standards.  
Overall, contacts expected the UK CMBS market to reopen in
2011 with insurance companies, pension funds and asset
managers seen as likely to be among investors.  But volumes
are likely to be much smaller than prior to the financial crisis;
most contacts suggested that total issuance of around 
£1 billion during 2011 would be seen as a positive start. 
Repurchase overnight index average (RONIA)
The Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association (WMBA) has
started to publish a new sterling secured overnight interest
rate index — the repurchase overnight index average
(RONIA).(1) Prior to this, data on traded overnight secured
interest rates had only been visible to those with access to
data from brokers, primarily market participants.  RONIA
therefore provides transparency on the volumes and the
interest rates at which overnight secured transactions take
place.  The Bank values this transparency because secured
overnight interest rates form part of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
The RONIA fixing is the weighted average interest rate of all
secured (ie repo) sterling overnight cash transactions of a
certain type.  The only eligible transactions are those
conducted via brokers using CREST’s delivery-by-value
mechanism, a way of borrowing sterling cash against gilt
collateral.  RONIA represents the secured analogue of the
sterling overnight index average (SONIA) fixing, which
captures unsecured overnight interest rates and is also
published by the WMBA.
Interest rates and trading volumes
Chart 19 shows RONIA fixings alongside the SONIA fixings
and Bank Rate.  This shows that RONIA and SONIA have
tended to move closely together.  Differences between the
SONIA (unsecured) and RONIA (secured) interest rates might
in part reflect collateral effects;  for example, a shortage of
collateral putting downward pressure on secured interest rates.
(1) See www.wmba.org.uk.  The WMBA has also made available a time series of the data














Source:  Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association.
Chart 19 SONIA and RONIA fixings, and Bank Rate 98 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
As well as the weighted average interest rate, the WMBA also
publishes the volume of trades transacted at each interest rate.
RONIA volumes have, on average, remained around the levels
that prevailed during the financial crisis, whereas unsecured
trading volumes have fallen over the past few years 
(Chart 20). 
Derivative instruments
As well as providing transparency, a published RONIA fixing
also facilitates the possible creation of derivative products
linked to secured overnight interest rates.  Just as there are
overnight index swaps (OIS) referenced to SONIA, contacts
have suggested that the publication of the RONIA fixing could
lead to OIS referenced to RONIA.  As well as possibly providing
a better way of hedging the interest rate risk on repo
transactions, such RONIA swaps would also offer an













Source:  Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association.
Chart 20 SONIA and RONIA volumes (28-day moving
average)